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INTRODUCTION 
 As used today, the term “equity” connotes a variety of related, but 
nonetheless distinct, ideas. In most contexts, equity refers to the body of 
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rules and doctrines that emerged in parallel with the common law, and 
which merged with the common law by the late nineteenth century.1 At a 
purely conceptual level, some trace the term back to Aristotle’s notion of 
epieikeia, or the process of infusing the law with sufficient flexibility to avoid 
injustice.2 Lastly, at a largely practical level, a few treat equity as 
synonymous with a set of remedies that courts can authorize, all of which 
are characterized by being “extraordinary” and “discretionary” in form and 
substance.3 
 While equity is often understood as either a repository of substantive 
rules and doctrines, or, more generally, as a parallel court system that 
developed in seventeenth and eighteenth century England with its own set 
of procedural rules and uniquely discretionary remedies, this understanding 
is incomplete in one important respect. Equity also represents a distinctive 
approach to legal reasoning within a primarily statute-centric area of law, 
involving an increased role for courts in the lawmaking process and a ready 
recourse to a set of ethical principles that are presumed to be normatively 
superior to the strict letter of the law.4 In the traditional common law this 
use of equity came to be known as the process of “equitable interpretation”5 
or as determining the “equity of the statute.”6 Used in this conception, it 
authorized courts to extend or restrict the otherwise clear words of a statute 
to give effect to the statute’s “ratio or purpose.”7 
In this Article, we argue that equity, understood in this sense, is deeply 
influential in the construction and operationalization of copyright doctrine. 
                                                
1 See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 489-91 (2d ed. 1832); 
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 673-74 (5th ed. 
1956); ROSCOE POUND, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 
118 (1904); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53-59 (1993).  
2 See Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of “Equity’” (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 119, 121-26 (1942). See generally Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Aristotle’s Doctrine of 
Equity, 4 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 352 (2008); Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1256 (1994); Jesús Vega, Legal Rules and Epieikeia in Aristotle: Post-
positivism Rediscovered, in ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE 
AND JUSTICE 171, 180 (Liesbeth Huppos-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho eds., 2013) (23 IUS 
GENTIUM: COMP. PERSP. ON L. & JUST.). 
3 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
524, 534-35 (1982); see also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable 
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 315-23 (2003); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of 
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). 
4 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001); 
Raymond B. Marcin, Epieikeia; Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 CONN. L. 
REV. 377 (1978).  
5 Manning, supra note 4, at 29. 
6 Id. at 29-30; see also RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 275 (2012). 
7 Manning, supra note 4, at 22. 
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While copyright law is obviously statutory in origin, the influence of equity 
on its working is best seen in relation to the role that the federal courts—
primarily the U.S. Supreme Court—have had on its shape and direction. In 
a variety of doctrinal areas, the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence 
reveals a distinct pattern of curbing behavior that, while in strict compliance 
with the letter of the law, is inconsistent with the values and purposes of the 
copyright system. The Supreme Court’s efforts to align the text of the 
statute’s directives with its perceived goals thus partakes of what the 
common law characterized as the process of giving effect to the equity of the 
statute. While premised on the notion of gap filling, the process was 
routinely directed at curtailing opportunistic behavior on the part of 
litigants who sought to take advantage of the statute’s literal terms, while 
violating the unstated normative goals of the legislation. A careful 
examination of Supreme Court decisions on core copyright issues over the 
last few decades reveals the profound role that the equity of the statute has 
had on the content of copyright doctrine. In addition, it sheds light on the 
real and all too often overlooked role that courts play in the creation and 
construction of both copyright doctrine and the copyright system’s 
underlying goals and values. 
To understand why copyright law has maintained such a close rapport 
with this understanding of equity, it is necessary to understand the symbiotic 
relationship between copyright law and technology. Very few legal areas are 
as profoundly affected by technological change as is copyright law. This 
reality of constant technological change, as well as the development of new 
business models in the market for informational goods and services, has 
required copyright law to update the applicability of its core goals and ideals 
to new situations. The formal content of its statutory directives has 
routinely proven to be outdated, and legislative reforms have often proven 
to be an inadequate means of redress.8 In these myriad situations, the Court 
has had to step in and use its interpretive powers to protect the normative 
integrity of our copyright system. In engaging in this process, the Court has 
effectively determined the equity of the copyright statute’s substantive 
content, despite occasional allusions to Congressional intent.9 We term this 
shaping of copyright’s core substantive rights by reference to an actual or 
imputed purpose (or set of goals) for the institution, the process of 
determining the “substantive equity of the statute.” 
                                                
8 For a recent account by the Register of Copyright, see Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great 
Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319-20 (2013). 
9 But see EKINS, supra note 6, at 275 (treating equitable interpretation as an act of discerning 
legislative intent). 
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Beginning with the Supreme Court’s famed decision in Harper & Row, 
where the Court introduced a “good faith” requirement into the statutory 
fair use analysis in order to hold the defendant liable,10 the Court has 
expanded, constricted, and molded the directives of the copyright statute by 
reference to the institution’s primary purposes. The same basic approach, we 
argue, serves to explain the Court’s decisions in the areas of: originality,11 
secondary liability,12 the first sale doctrine and its applicability to grey-
market imports,13 and, most recently, in the public performance right.14 In 
each of these instances the Court’s stated objective was to bring the 
substantive content of copyright doctrine in line with its own conception of 
copyright’s principal values and ideals, recognizing that the text of the law 
allowed actors to ensure token compliance with the system, while subverting 
its motivating goals and objectives. An unstated recourse to the “equity of 
the statute” allowed the Court to shape copyright law to realign its content 
with its purposes. 
Somewhat interestingly, equity’s role as an unstated substantive gloss on 
copyright doctrine is to be contrasted with equity’s express influence on the 
adjectival content of the copyright statute. We see equity playing a more 
overt role in shaping the copyright statute’s procedural and remedial 
dimensions. In these areas, copyright law is conceived of by the Court as 
having been built against a set of background principles relating to the 
interaction between equity and the common law as parallel systems. The 
Court’s copyright jurisprudence in these domains can be seen as balancing 
this interaction and preserving the traditional virtues of equitable 
decisionmaking—flexibility, discretion, and remedial equilibration—to allow 
future courts to give effect to copyright’s goals and purposes on a situational 
basis.15 This flexibility and discretion are in turn meant to be directed at 
policing parties’ use of the copyright system to ensure that such use 
conforms to the underlying purposes of the system. Here too, the Court’s 
jurisprudence can be seen as an effort to determine the equity of the statute. 
We characterize this approach as relating to the “adjectival equity of the statute.” 
                                                
10 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); see infra 
subsection II.A.1. 
11 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see infra subsection 
II.A.2.  
12 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see infra 
subsection II.A.3. 
13 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); see infra subsection II.A.4. 
14 See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); see infra subsection II.A.5.  
15 See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. 
REV. 537, 542 (1913); Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905). 
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 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to the copyright statute’s 
remedial and procedural rules offers a good illustration of this phenomenon. 
In the areas of awarding a prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees,16 
understanding the requirement of copyright registration as a prerequisite 
for a civil action,17 and most recently relating to the availability of an 
independent laches defense to infringement,18 we see the Court rejecting 
doctrinal formulations aimed at minimizing judicial discretion. When 
presented with two competing interpretations of the statute, both of which 
further copyright’s purposes in some measure, the Court is seen to prefer 
the one that would preserve its flexibility for the future: a flexibility that it 
characterizes as necessary to realize an alignment between copyright’s 
systemic goals and individual litigants’ motives. 
 Equity thus modulates copyright law as both a substantive and 
adjectival gloss on doctrine. In the former, equity’s mechanism is subtle, 
unstated, and often masked by a recourse to congressional intent; in the 
latter, it is overt, express, and tied to equity’s emphasis on discretion and 
flexibility. Beyond shedding light on the role of equity in copyright law, the 
interplay between the two approaches also explains an important and often 
ignored attribute of copyright law that relates directly to the central theme 
of this Symposium: the perceived and actual role that courts play in 
determining the content of copyright doctrine and the goals of the 
copyright system. 
 An important caveat is in order here. In describing the Supreme Court’s 
use of the statute’s equity to develop copyright law under the copyright 
statute, we should not be understood as suggesting that the Court’s 
substantive outcomes in the individual cases were “equitable” in the sense of 
being fair and just, nor indeed that the rule developed by the Court in the 
case was equitable in that sense. We do not make any such claim. Our 
concern in this Article is with explaining the process of lawmaking adopted 
by the Court in its copyright jurisprudence, and its efforts to fit and justify 
the process and outcome as a matter of copyright law and policy.19 The 
ambition of this Article is, therefore, purely explanatory, not normative.  
The Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
equity and the various ways in which the term has been used in legal 
thinking. Part II then illustrates the working of equity in copyright law, and 
differentiates between equity’s role as a substantive and adjectival gloss on 
                                                
16 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
17 See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
18 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
19 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-60 (1975). 
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copyright doctrine. The paper then concludes by relating equity’s role in 
copyright law to the question of how doctrine is created, shaped, and 
legitimized by courts in the copyright discourse. 
I. THE “EQUITY” OF THE STATUTE 
 To Aristotle, equity represented the phenomenon of closing the gap 
between justice and the formal or written law, or as he puts it “a correction 
of law, where law falls short because of its universality.”20 Later he describes 
the idea again as “that justice which lies beyond the written law.”21 In these 
early uses of the term, “equity” represented an effort to discern the spirit or 
ideal of a law, to ensure that the formal structural and institutional 
limitations of the law do not impede its realization and produce injustice. 
Today, “equity” means a variety of different things in contemporary legal 
discourse. Yet, Aristotle’s conceptualization has remained influential in 
shaping our understanding of equity and its use by courts. Consequently, 
equity continues to be thought of as a mechanism for interpreting and 
supplementing the formal law to ensure just and correct results.22  
This gap-filling notion of equity predates the development of equity as a 
separate basis for jurisdiction in the Courts of Chancery in sixteenth-
century England.23 To mitigate the perceived rigidities of the formal 
common law, as developed and dispensed by the King’s Courts, a 
mechanism developed in England for petitioning the Lord Chancellor for 
relief on a discretionary basis, which came to be known as equity.24 While 
this system originated in the ideal of discretion, it soon came to acquire a 
formal rigidity akin to the common law, and thus emerged as a parallel 
system. Only in the mid–nineteenth century did the two systems—equity 
and the common law—come to be formally merged in England.25 In the 
exercise of this jurisdiction, the Courts of Chancery, in turn, came to develop 
and administer a variety of special remedies, which continued to be described 
as “equitable” long after equity ceased to remain an independent jurisdiction. 
                                                
20 Shiner, supra note 2, at 1247 (translating the quote from ARISTOTLE, ETHICA 
NICOMACHEA bk. V, at 111 (I. Bywater ed., 1894) (c. 384 B.C.E.)). 
21 Id. (translating the quote from ARISTOTLE, ARS RHETORICA bk. I, at 59 (W.D. Ross 
ed., 1959) (c. 330 B.C.E.)). 
22 See, e.g., William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 51 (1993) (describing the role of equity in the Delaware Chancery Court). 
23 William H. Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76, 76 (1909). 
24 See 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-263 (7th ed. 
1956); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1916).  
25 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 638 (3d ed. 1922) 
(discussing the role of the Judicature Acts in effecting this merger). 
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As a mechanism of gap-filling, equity assumed special significance 
within the common law when it came to the interpretation, application, and 
elaboration of statutes. This occurred through the doctrine of the “equity of 
the statute” or “equitable interpretation.”26 The doctrine finds elaboration in 
the leading accounts of equity and the common law.27 John Norton Pomeroy, 
in his well-known treatise on equity thus notes that it 
[T]akes place when the provisions of a statute, being perfectly clear, do not 
in terms embrace a case which, in the opinion of the judge, would have been 
embraced if the legislator had carried out his general design. The judge . . . 
interprets the statute extensively, or according to its equity, and treats it is 
as though it actually did include the particular case.28 
Similarly, Sir Edward Coke defines it as the 
[C]onstruction made by the Judges, that cases out of the letter of a statute 
yet being within the same mischiefe, or cause of the making of the same, 
shall bee within the same remedie that the Statute provideth; And the 
reason hereof is for that the Law-maker could not possibly set downe all 
cases in expresse termes . . . .29 
The doctrine of the equity of the statute refers to the process by which a 
court seeks to align the purpose or general design of the statute with its 
doctrinal directives, even when the literal terms of those directives do not 
suggest such an alignment.30 It entails imputing indeterminacy to the 
textual content of the statute and then resolving that indeterminacy by 
recourse to the normative goals and purposes of the statute or area in 
question. In essence then, “equitable interpretation,” or the approach of 
discerning the equity of a statute, shares several important characteristics 
with the core tenets of Legal Realism: a belief in the insufficiency of formal 
law (i.e., textual law) as a mechanism for deciding individual cases, the need 
to resort to normative considerations of policy and purpose to understand 
and apply the law, and the recognition that courts—namely, judges—do 
                                                
26 See Frederick J. deSloovère, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591 
(1936); Loyd, supra note 23, at 76; Manning, supra note 4, at 22; Marcin, supra note 4, at 392-97. 
27 See, e.g., 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 596-97 (Robert Campbell 
ed., 4th ed. 1873); 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 649 (3d ed. 
1768); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91; 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (1785).  
28 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 44 (4th ed. 1918). 
29 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), reprinted in 2 THE 
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 573, 682 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
30 Manning, supra note 4, at 22-27. 
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more than just declare the law in individual cases.31 It is therefore no simple 
coincidence that some of the most vocal defenders of this doctrine in the 
early twentieth century were major figures in the Legal Realist movement, 
including Max Radin and James Landis.32 
Determining the equity of a statute was thus unquestionably a process of 
lawmaking, a reality the proponents of the doctrine readily acknowledged 
and embraced.33 Those who favored its use preferred it as an interpretive 
approach to textualism (which emphasized looking to the bare text of a 
statute and its plain meaning) and intentionalism (which looked to 
Congressional intent as the touchstone of interpretation).34  
Indeed, the Legal Realist critique of legislative intent formed the 
backdrop for the mid–twentieth century revival of the doctrine of the 
equity of the statute.35 Its proponents routinely described it as integral to 
the “collaborative” model of lawmaking, where courts were seen as engaged 
in a continuous dialogue with Congress (or other legislative bodies) not just 
about the application of the law but also about its normative and doctrinal 
content.36 As a practical matter then, the process of determining the equity 
of a statute consciously conflated the judicial roles under the common law 
and under a statutory regime, relying extensively on the development of a 
corpus of judge-made precedents to influence the future growth and 
direction of the law in an inductive manner.  
One may of course question whether this conception of equity bears any 
real connection to equity as a body of discretionary rules and remedies at 
all, or whether it is a mere attempt at a repurposing of the term for what is, 
in effect, a process of “purposive” statutory interpretation. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, there remains an important relationship 
between the two. Insofar as equity developed as a body of rules and as a 
method of lawmaking that served to supplement the rigidity of the common 
                                                
31 For an account of the idea that courts do indeed make law in individual cases, see Karl N. 
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 452 (1930). 
32 See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL 
ESSAYS 213 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934); Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 
388 (1942); see also Marcin, supra note 4, at 398 (“[I]t was left to the American realists . . . to once 
again release the gremlin of equitable lawmaking by judges . . . .”). 
33 Manning, supra note 4, at 22-25. 
34 Id. at 25. 
35 For the Legal Realist’s critique of legislative intent, see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE 
NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 172-73 (Macmillan 1921); and Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930); see also United States v. Klinger, 199 F. 2d 645, 
648 (2d Cir. 1952). 
36 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 
(1987); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
541 (1988).  
  
2015] Equity’s Unstated Domain 1867 
 
law and to ensure that opportunistic behavior by litigants in individual cases 
did not go unaddressed in the absence of more fine-grained tools,37 equity in 
both its stand-alone and statutory conceptions can be seen as aimed at 
accomplishing the same result or goal. Of course, the primary difference is 
that, in one instance, the blunt instrument being corrected (or 
supplemented) is itself judge-made, adding an element of institutional 
legitimacy to the process. In the other, it is legislative, requiring an added 
institutional account to justify heightened judicial involvement therein. To 
be sure, scholars—principally of the textualist bent—have critiqued courts’ 
reliance on the doctrine of the equity of the statute on precisely these 
grounds, namely, for violating the separation of powers ideal.38  
For the purposes of this Article, we use the term “equity” primarily to 
refer to the process of normative legal reasoning and statutory 
interpretation, characterized by the doctrine of a statute’s equity. In the 
copyright context, it represents situations in which courts develop a rule of 
copyright law that intermeshes the textual directives of the statute with 
their own understandings of copyright’s goals and objectives. While the 
equity of the statute is our primary concern here, we also look to how that 
process itself understands and elaborates certain traditional rules of 
equity—now understood as a body of discretionary rules and remedies. In 
other words, as we show in our discussion of the adjectival equity of the 
statute, the superimposition of the equity of the statute over equitable rules 
contained in the statute presents an interesting account of what equity 
entails in this domain of copyright law. 
II. THE EQUITY OF THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE 
As a purely formal matter today, federal copyright law is governed by a 
statute, the Copyright Act.39 Copyright is structured as a set of exclusive 
rights that relate to an original work of expression.40 In the typical case, the 
exclusive set of rights vests in the author, who may freely alienate or license 
those exclusive rights to others, much like ordinary personal property.41 The 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights revolve around the central idea of 
                                                
37 For an account of equity that understands this function in terms of curbing opportunistic 
behavior, see Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 6-38 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_ 
LawVersusEquity7.pdf. 
38 For the leading account, see Manning, supra note 4, at 56-126. 
39 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012). 
40 Id. § 102. 
41 Id. § 201. 
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reproduction, without which an infringement typically does not occur.42 
Generally, an unauthorized reproduction, distribution, performance, display, 
or adaptation of the protected work amounts to an “infringement” that the 
copyright owner has the option of enforcing through the statute’s private 
law machinery.43 
To establish an infringement, a copyright owner must generally prove 
that she owns a valid copyright in the work in question, that the defendant 
copied protected expression from the work, and that such copying was 
“substantial” enough to be treated as actionable.44 Once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of infringement, the defendant can invoke any 
of the statute’s applicable defenses to copyright infringement. While some 
of these immunities are of general applicability—such as the fair use 
doctrine45 and the doctrine of first sale46—others are subject-matter specific 
or pertain to certain categories of protected works.47 
 Copyright law is complex and builds on a host of different concepts, 
drawn from property, torts, unjust enrichment, and contract law. This 
complex edifice of the institution is at its base meant to be in service of a 
higher ideal, one that is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, where Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 empowers Congress to enact copyright legislation “[t]o 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”48 Ever since its origins 
in Anglo-American law, copyright has been understood as serving a 
predominantly utilitarian goal, captured in the idea of the “encouragement 
of learning” and the prevention of “detriment” and “ruin” to authors and 
their families.49 Over the years, courts, scholars, and legislators have given 
this utilitarian ideal more concrete expression through the notion of creator 
incentives, under which copyright’s structure of exclusive rights is taken to 
encourage authors to produce creative expression, which is in turn seen to 
inure to the benefit of society more broadly.50 All the same, copyright’s 
                                                
42 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[A] 
(2011) (“[A]bsent copying, there can be no infringement of copyright . . . .”). For an elaboration, 
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2012). 
43 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)–(b). 
44 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, §§ 13.01–.05. 
45 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
46 17 U.S.C. § 109. It is to be noted that the first sale defense applies only to the exclusive 
right of distribution but not to other exclusive rights. Id. 
47 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 112, 117, 119, 121, 122. 
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
49 These phrases were used in the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne. Copyright Act, 
1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). 
50 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003). 
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bundle of exclusive rights operates as a limited monopoly, and in so doing 
imposes costs on the public by restricting their ability to use and copy a 
work, once produced and protected. Since copyright is, in the end, justified 
by reference to its public (or social) benefit, its utilitarian ideal of 
encouraging creativity comes to be qualified by the public’s need for 
access.51 It is in the balance between the two that modern copyright law’s 
primary purpose is taken to lie. 
While the copyright act strives to be comprehensive in its coverage of 
copyright’s core principles, its directives remain incomplete in capturing the 
system’s analytical and normative complexity. Several of copyright’s most 
important doctrines find no mention at all in the text of the statute,52 or 
instead find passing mention at best.53 Moreover, all of the statutory 
dictates are susceptible to a related, yet distinct, problem: their adaptability 
to new circumstances and new technologies. As technology has developed, it 
has spawned new forms of creativity. At the same time, it has resulted in the 
proliferation of new technologies for using and copying existing works, and, 
in turn, facilitated new kinds of behavior among both creators and users. 
The text of the copyright statute—crystallized as it was in 1976—has had to 
keep up with these realities, and give effect to the system’s core objectives, 
especially as they emanate from copyright’s constitutionally enshrined 
utilitarian goals. It is in this latter respect that federal courts have resorted 
to the equity of the copyright statute to ensure that behavior and new 
technologies come to be governed by the spirit and purposes of the 
copyright system, even if not expressly by the terms of the copyright 
statute. Through a complex interplay between the text of the copyright 
statute and these purposes, courts have successfully updated copyright doctrine. 
In this process courts rarely, if ever, expressly mention the doctrine of 
the equity of the statute. All the same, there can be no doubt that in many 
cases, courts do more than merely apply the statute. Rather, they engage in 
lawmaking. Somewhat interestingly, this tracks the very evolution in the use 
of the doctrine of equity of the statute over the last century. By the late 
nineteenth century, courts across the country began to reject parties’ express 
reliance on the doctrine, especially in situations where it was seen as a 
                                                
51 Id. at 20-21. 
52 For instance, copyright’s requirement of “substantial similarity” is not mentioned in the 
statute. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01. For a fuller account, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012). 
53 For example copyright’s “originality” requirement, which is mentioned once in the statute. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). For a normative reconstruction based on this ambiguity, see Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009). 
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method of annulling the directives of a statute.54 Central to this rejection 
was the recognition that the doctrine enabled courts to overtly exercise “the 
power of legislation,”55 which was seen as repugnant to contemporary “views 
as to the function of the judiciary.”56 Thus emerged the modified position 
that the best way of interpreting a statute was instead to look to the 
legislature’s “intent,” when the text produced anomalous results. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Holy Trinity is a prime example of this move. 
There, the Court constructed the “spirit” of the legislation, but concluded 
that this spirit was embodied in the “intention” of the legislators, and 
therefore was a legitimate way to construe the statute in question.57 The 
intentionalist approach thus came to replace the ready recourse to the 
equity of the statute and soon dominated the landscape.58 
A central aim of Legal Realism was to have courts lay bare their 
normative influences when deciding cases, rather than hide behind doctrinal 
categories and formal rules. To the Realists, hiding behind the cloak of 
legislative intent was therefore an anathema.59 In addition, they sought to 
expose the reality that courts were actively engaging in lawmaking, rather 
than merely declaring the law, which they in turn viewed as largely 
unproblematic. Their solution was thus to resurrect courts’ reliance on the 
equity of the statute as a method of interpretation and lawmaking. The 
intentionalist approach was seen as a form of “dissembling.”60 Their revived 
vision for the equity of the statute doctrine was not just one that annulled 
the terms of the statute when unfavorable but rather one where judges 
regularly supplemented and augmented the legislation with policy 
considerations. It was thus “purposive” and actively embraced judicial 
lawmaking.61 This was in contrast to the intentionalist approach that saw 
judicial lawmaking as illegitimate, and to the old invocation of the equity of 
the statute that was largely agnostic on this issue. To realize this revival, the 
Legal Realists did not need courts to use the idea of a statute’s equity 
explicitly, given their supplementing (rather than annulling) role. Thus, by 
the mid–twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s realist justices came to 
                                                
54 See, e.g., Tompkins v. First Nat’l Bank, 18 N.Y.S. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892); Encking v. 
Simmons, 28 Wis. 272 (1871). 
55 Loyd, supra note 23, at 84. 
56 Id. 
57 Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule that 
a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). 
58 Manning, supra note 4, at 15. 
59 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
60 Landis, supra note 32, at 219. 
61 Manning, supra note 4, at 24. 
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describe the doctrine as an “artificial canon”62 and as entailing a “loose 
conception,”63 even though their actual decisions in these cases themselves 
focused on the statute’s goals and purposes to construct and supplement its 
text. The equity of the statute was now playing a principally unstated role. 
In his well-known piece on the canons of statutory interpretation, Karl 
Llewellyn thus concluded that:  
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court 
must do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the 
statute—or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative reshaping 
of the net result is thus inevitable.64  
“Creative reshaping” in light of the actual or constructed purpose and policy 
of a statute was thus seen as an inevitable consequence of doctrinal 
indeterminacy, the principal hallmark of the Realist critique. Llewellyn 
readily points out that in numerous situations, talk of legislative “intent” is 
meaningless; especially in situations where the statutory language “is called 
upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its 
passage.”65 A “broad purpose” is thus to be “quarried” out of the statute in 
its application.66 There is little doubt that Llewellyn describes in near-exact 
terms the modern version of the equity of the statute doctrine, in its 
unstated form. 
And it is precisely such a “creative reshaping” that we see at play in the 
Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence under the 1976 Act. While never 
once invoking the equity of the statute, the Court recognizes itself to be 
making new law, filling gaps in the doctrine, and performing a role 
analogous to that of traditional equity: ensuring that the bluntness of a 
general rule does not result in circumvention of its core purpose or spirit. 
We see this occurring in relation to both the substantive and adjectival (i.e., 
procedural and remedial) content of the Act. In what follows, we show that 
several of the Supreme Court’s most prominent copyright decisions can be 
                                                
62 United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709, 721 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“I am no friend of artificial canons of construction, and I would not strain language in 
order to construe tax exemptions strictly. On the other hand, Revenue Acts are not the kind of 
legislation which should be loosely construed in order to grant exemptions.”). 
63 Lewyt Corp. v. Comm’r, 349 U.S. 237, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Where the 
taxing measure is clear, of course, there is no place for loose conceptions about the ‘equity of the 
statute.’ Revenue laws are notoriously not expressions of an ordered system of reason and 
fairness.”). 
64 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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understood as efforts to give effect to the substantive and adjectival equity 
of the copyright statute.67  
A. Copyright’s Substantive Equity 
Most of copyright’s substantive content—rights, liabilities, powers, and 
immunities—is specified in the Copyright Act of 1976. Despite this reality, 
courts attempting to understand and apply the statutory directives to 
specific situations soon realize that many of the questions posed by the 
modern day application of the statute were simply not foreseeable to 
Congress at the time that the statute was enacted. Consequently, courts 
cannot simply apply the law in those situations. The Supreme Court’s 
preferred approach in such circumstances exhibits a remarkable resemblance 
to the equity of the statute doctrine. 
In its copyright jurisprudence, the Court usually begins with a 
recognition that copyright law is principally statutory in origin, and that its 
own task is therefore one of applying the relevant statutory directive as the 
preexisting doctrine. Yet, a close reading of the statute reveals hardly any 
guidance as to how this task should be performed. The recognition that the 
law is indeterminate, in turn, allows the Court to discern an underlying 
purpose behind copyright’s statutory scheme. This purpose usually 
manifests itself in varying levels of generality and abstraction: it may be 
traced back to copyright’s utilitarian ideal as enshrined in the Constitution, 
translated into incentive terms, represented in the statute’s contextual 
approach to realizing its utilitarian goal, or characterized in the statute’s 
unique structural history. Once the purpose is discerned, the specific 
statutory directive in question is construed in light of this identified 
purpose, with alternative readings of the ambiguous term then treated as 
incompatible with the scheme of the statute.  
Recall that the equity of the statute doctrine—in its Realist 
formulation—involved courts discerning a “spirit” or “purpose” behind the 
statute, and then using that to make law without explicitly overriding the 
terms of the statute. In area after area of substantive copyright 
jurisprudence, we find the Court relying on copyright’s core goals to glean 
                                                
67 We do not claim that our theory applies to all of the Supreme Court’s copyright decisions, 
some of which were motivated by altogether independent considerations. A few, for instance, were 
driven by the Court’s reliance on constitutional principles. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (analyzing the constitutional validity of the 
Copyright Term Extension Act); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) 
(interpreting the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial as applicable to copyright trials 
involving statutory damages). 
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meaning from otherwise plain statutory language. The discussion below 
illustrates this pattern using areas from the Court’s substantive copyright 
jurisprudence. 
1. Fair Use: Harper & Row 
The fair use doctrine, copyright’s principal safety valve, allows courts to 
treat specific acts of copying as non-infringing under certain circumstances. 
Originally a creation of the federal courts,68 the fair use doctrine was 
codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.69 As codified, section 
107 delineates four non-exhaustive statutory factors that courts are to 
consider during a fair use determination.70 
In Harper & Row, the plaintiff was a publisher that had entered into a 
contract to publish President Ford’s memoir as a book.71 Prior to the 
publication of the book, the defendant, the Nation Magazine, obtained a 
purloined copy of the manuscript from an undisclosed source, and 
proceeded to run a news story, excerpting from the book and revealing its 
central part. In the news industry, this was a practice known as “scooping.”72 
Unhappy with these actions, the plaintiff commenced an action for 
copyright infringement against the defendants, who in turn claimed that 
their actions constituted fair use—especially since they were engaged in 
news reporting.73  
The Court began its opinion with a discussion of copyright’s overall 
purpose, which it identified as being to “motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.”74 This purpose, the Court noted, was 
manifest in the “scheme established by the Copyright Act.”75 These 
                                                
68 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
69 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
70 These factors include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
71 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542-44 (1985). 
72 Id. at 556. 
73 Id. at 543-44. 
74 Id. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). 
75 Id. at 545. 
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observations were more than mere rhetoric, for the Court then proceeded to 
recognize that among the copyright owner’s important rights that derive 
from this logic was the right of first publication, which it reasoned was 
essential to motivating creativity.76 The right of first publication finds no 
explicit mention in the list of exclusive rights mentioned in the Act, and yet 
the Court relied in large part on the overall scheme of the Act, copyright’s 
ideal of motivating creativity, and the legislative history—which indicated 
that Congress intended to equate publication with distribution—in order to 
read this right into the copyright entitlement.77  
Upon reading this right into the Act, the Court proceeded to carry out 
its analysis of fair use. Building on its prior logic, the Court treated the 
right of first publication as “shift[ing]” the “balance of equities” in favor of 
the plaintiff.78 In the Court’s view, the unpublished nature of the work 
operated to “negate a defense of fair use.”79 Moving to a direct application 
of the four factors, the Court then used this idea to weigh some of the 
obvious fair use factors, which might have otherwise favored fair use, 
against the defendant. It relied on the unpublished nature of the work, 
together with the fact that the defendant used the work knowing that the 
copy it possessed had been stolen to scoop its content, as a basis for 
characterizing the defendant’s behavior as lacking “good faith.”80 The 
unpublished nature of the work also allowed the Court to overcome the 
reality that the work itself was largely factual/historical, rather than original, 
in content.81 Finding that the copying was substantial and had produced an 
adverse market effect on the plaintiff ’s work, the Court denied the 
defendant’s fair use claim, despite the fact that (1) “news reporting” is 
enumerated in the statute as a form of fair use,82 (2) the statute does not 
enumerate good faith as a relevant factor in fair use determinations,83 and 
(3) the right of first publication was likewise not mentioned in the statute. 
                                                
76 Id. at 549. 
77 Id. at 551-52; see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 42, § 8.11[C][1][b] (“The opinion went out of 
its way to confer special solicitude on the right of first publication in safeguarding it against a 
capacious fair use construction . . . .”). 
78 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553.  
79 Id. at 554. 
80 Id. at 562-63. 
81 Id. at 563-64. 
82 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
83 Id. Indeed, not only is there not a single mention of good faith, but the statute also 
explicitly provides that fair use can be found even for unpublished works. “The fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of 
all the above factors.” Id. 
  
2015] Equity’s Unstated Domain 1875 
 
While the Court in Harper & Row certainly made every effort to appear 
to be working within the directives of the Act, its reasoning unquestionably 
transcended the terms of the statute, and the Court drew extensively from 
its own reconstruction of Congress’s goals behind the copyright system, 
which it projected into specific elements of copyright doctrine. 
2. Originality: Feist 
 Copyright protects “original works of authorship.”84 Beyond this 
fleeting mention of the term, the statute nowhere defines nor 
operationalizes the idea of originality—despite the reality that historically 
courts have treated it as a critical prerequisite for copyright protection. In 
1991, the Supreme Court was called upon to give content to the idea for the 
first time under the Act of 1976.85 
Feist involved a plaintiff that produced an alphabetically arranged 
telephone directory consisting of the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of individuals and businesses in a region.86 The defendant, another 
manufacturer of telephone directories, copied significant portions of the 
plaintiff ’s directory into its own directory.87 The question before the Court 
was whether the plaintiff ’s telephone directory was sufficiently original to 
receive copyright protection as a compilation.88 The Court answered the 
question in the negative, and in so doing, transformed the doctrine of 
originality. 
In trying to give meaning to “originality,” the Court began by 
attempting to tie the term to copyright’s overall purpose. Since the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to protect only the “writings” of 
“[a]uthors,” the Court treated this as requiring some “intellectual labor,” 
deriving from the “creative powers of the mind.”89 Originality was thus seen 
as requiring a “creative component.”90 The Court therefore concluded that 
originality was constitutionally mandated, and that it required a “modicum 
of creativity” on the part of the author.91  
To get to this position, however, the Court had to overcome a line of 
cases that had developed a theory of copyright known as the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine, which equated originality with any labor on the part of the 
                                                
84 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
85 Feist, Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
86 Id. at 342. 
87 Id. at 342-44. 
88 Id. at 344. 
89 Id. at 346-47. 
90 Id. at 346. 
91 Id. at 362. 
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creator, whether creative or not.92 In enacting the Act of 1976, Congress did 
not expressly overrule this doctrine.93 Nor was the legislative history 
explicit about a legislative intent to so overrule.94 It was therefore left to the 
Court to craft an argument that delegitimized the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine. The Court stated that the doctrine “flouted basic copyright 
principles.”95 Comparing the terms of the 1976 Act to its predecessor, the 
1909 Act, and the former’s use of the term “originality” in its definition of a 
“compilation,” the Court concluded that the statutory structure 
unquestionably recognizes that copyright (in a compilation) cannot arise 
from mere labor, since every compilation entails some labor, but the Act 
limits protection to original compilations.96 This meant that some 
compilations may indeed not qualify for protection without some “creative” 
selection or arrangement.97 Building on this logic, the Court eventually 
concluded that there was “no doubt” that originality replaced “sweat of the 
brow” given the Act’s guiding purposes—in turn enabling it to equate 
originality with creativity, and “sweat of the brow” with mere labor.98 
Feist provides a powerful example of the Court’s tacit invocation of the 
equity of the copyright statute to inform its substantive content. Rooting 
originality in the overall constitutionally dictated purposes of the Act, even 
in the absence of express guidance within the statute, allowed the Court to 
reconstruct copyright doctrine in the image of its own vision for what 
copyright law was striving to do in protecting works of expression: 
encouraging creative labor. 
3. Secondary Liability: Sony and Grokster 
In addition to imposing potential liability on actors who infringe any of 
the exclusive rights granted to owners under the Act, copyright law also 
imposes such liability on actors who “contribute” to the infringement, while 
not infringing the work themselves. Known as indirect infringement, or 
secondary liability, this form of liability finds but a passing mention in the 
1976 Act, which grants copyright owners exclusive rights “to do and to 
authorize” certain actions.99 In two cases, the Court had to grapple with the 
scope of secondary liability. 
                                                
92 Id. at 352-53. 
93 Id. at 355-56. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 354. 
96 Id. at 356-58. 
97 Id. at 359. 
98 Id. at 359-60. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  
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In Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, the Court was called upon to 
examine the liability of a VCR manufacturer under the theory of 
contributory infringement.100 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s 
device was being actively used by consumers for infringing purposes, 
rendering its act of introducing the device into the stream of commerce an 
act of contributory infringement.101 In its well-known opinion, the Court 
found for the defendant. Readily recognizing that the statute was quiet on 
the scope and extent of such liability, the Court located the doctrine’s 
purpose in “the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may 
require courts to look beyond actual duplication . . . to the products or 
activities that make such duplication possible.”102 At the same time, the 
Court recognized that this necessitated a balance between enhanced 
protection and the “rights of others freely to engage in . . . commerce.”103 
Drawing on the doctrine of contributory infringement as developed in 
patent law, the Court developed its own version of the balance: liability for 
contributory infringement could be avoided if the device or product was 
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”104 Applying the test to the VCR, 
the Court concluded that users could engage either in time-shifting that was 
authorized by copyright owners or in unauthorized time-shifting that could 
qualify as fair use, which rendered the VCR capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.105  
Sony’s principal contribution thus lies in its development of the 
“substantial noninfringing use” defense to contributory infringement. 
While it was developed in common law fashion owing to the absence of any 
express statutory directive, the Court nonetheless sought to ensure that its 
formulation was compatible with the overall goals and purposes of the 
Copyright Act. In finding for the defendants, the Court’s opinion also 
seems to reject the idea that it was making new law when it concluded that 
“it is not our [i.e., the Court’s] job to apply laws that have not yet been 
written.”106 Rather, the Court viewed its opinion as merely “[a]pplying the 
copyright statute, as it now reads . . . .”107 Unquestionably then, the Court in 
Sony determined the equity of the statute and translated it into an 
                                                
100 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 442. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 456. 
105 Id. at 442-56. 
106 Id. at 456. 
107 Id. 
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altogether new defense, which it viewed as entailed by the spirit of the 
copyright statute. 
Two decades later, the Court was called upon to revisit its holding in 
Sony in another case involving secondary liability, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. Here, the technology in question was a peer-to-
peer file sharing service that allowed individual users to share unauthorized 
copies of music and video with each other over the Internet.108 The 
distributors of the technology, unlike the defendants in Sony, were shown to 
have known about such infringing uses, done nothing about it, and indeed, 
according to the Court, encouraged infringements by end-users.109 The 
Court was asked to examine whether the “substantial noninfringing use” 
defense it had developed in Sony might apply here. 
Once again, the Court began its decision with a reference to the need for 
“a sound balance” between encouraging creativity, on the one hand, and 
promoting innovation in new communication technologies—copyright’s 
core utilitarian goal—on the other.110 Instead of reconsidering its decision in 
Sony, however, the Court chose to skirt the issue by concluding that the Sony 
defense had no application to the case.111 Having summarily disposed of 
Sony, the Grokster Court then chose to develop an altogether new theory of 
secondary liability, once again by reference to patent law: liability for 
inducement, which attaches to “one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright.”112 It then used this new standard 
to find against the defendants in the case and impose liability.113 Much like 
the Sony Court, the Grokster Court was also motivated by the need to 
balance the conflicting demands of incentives and access. Yet, unlike in Sony, 
it saw the balance tilting in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Unlike in Sony, the Court in Grokster made no effort to argue that its 
reasoning was no more than an application of the statute itself. This was 
perhaps in express recognition that two decades after Sony, it was rather 
obvious to all that the Court was not just applying the statute to a new case, 
but was indeed making altogether new law. 
                                                
108 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-27 (2005). 
109 Id. at 925-26.  
110 Id. at 928. 
111 Id. at 934. 
112 Id. at 936. 
113 Id. at 941. 
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4. First Sale: Kirtsaeng 
 The exclusive right to distribute copies of the work to the public is 
among the exclusive rights that the Copyright Act grants authors.114 The 
“first sale” doctrine emerged as one of the earliest exceptions to this right. 
The doctrine deals with the bifurcation of the ownership of the physical 
medium embodying the copyrighted content and of the copyright in the 
underlying work.115 In other words, the first sale doctrine permits purchasers 
of products containing a copyrighted work (e.g., a book containing a literary 
work) to transfer the physical product to others, without thereby violating 
the copyright owner’s distribution right.  
The 1976 Act codified the first sale defense for the first time, but limited 
its application to owners of particular copies that were “lawfully made” 
under the Act.116 Additionally, the Act also treated the unauthorized 
importation of copies acquired outside the country into the United States as 
a violation of the distribution right.117 While it was accepted that the first 
sale doctrine applied to such importations, the question arose whether the 
phrase “lawfully made” required the product or copy in question to have 
been manufactured domestically.118 
In Quality King Distributors v. L’Anza Research,119 the Supreme Court was 
asked to determine the relationship between the first sale doctrine and the 
ban on unauthorized importation of copies of protected works, as it appears 
in § 602(a). L’Anza, a manufacturer of hair care products, brought suit 
against Quality King Distributors for purchasing L’Anza’s products abroad 
and subsequently importing and selling them in the United States.120 
L’Anza claimed that this practice violated the anti-importation ban in 
§ 602(a) since L’Anza’s hair care products bore copyrighted labels.121 Quality 
King argued that the suit should be dismissed since its actions came within 
the scope of the first sale doctrine, which allowed owners of lawfully made 
copies of copyrighted works to deal with them as they see fit, inter alia, by 
reselling them.122 In response L’Anza asserted that the first sale privilege 
                                                
114 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
115 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (“The purchaser of a book, once sold 
by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new 
edition of it.”). 
116 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
117 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). 
118 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145-46 (1998). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 139-40. 
121 Id. at 140. 
122 Id. 
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applied only to copies purchased in United States, while those purchased 
abroad were subject to the anti-importation ban in § 602(a).123 In other 
words, the key disagreement between the parties concerned the geographic 
reach of the first sale doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens 
concluded that the right granted to the plaintiff by § 602(a) was 
unquestionably subject to § 109(a).124 The Court proceeded to explain that 
“[a]fter the first sale of a copyrighted item ‘lawfully made under this title,’ 
any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or from a foreign 
reseller, is obviously an ‘owner’ of that item” and could resell it under the 
first sale doctrine.125  
The opinion of the Court seemed to have closed the door on any 
attempt by copyright owners to expand the scope of their protection by 
attempting to ban importation of lawful copies of copyrighted work. But 
not quite. The Court was invited to revisit the issue in Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons.126  
In Kirtsaeng, the defendant had legally purchased authorized, low-priced 
editions of books that were published and printed outside the United States 
and resold them in the United States for significantly higher prices, making 
a large profit in the process.127 The publisher-plaintiff argued that these 
actions were not covered by the first sale doctrine because the books were 
not “lawfully made” within the United States.128 The defendant, on the 
other hand, argued that the phrase did not impose a geographic requirement 
but simply suggested that the defense would apply as long as the 
manufacturing of the books was “in compliance with” the general terms of 
the statute.129  
The Court’s reasoning in Kirtsaeng, unlike in other copyright cases, was 
less about trying to make affirmative sense out of the statute’s directives and 
creating a new rule and more about seeking to limit the application and 
reach of the statute’s blunt-edged directive. The plaintiff ’s reading of the 
term would have expanded the reach of the statute quite significantly, 
thereby rendering large swaths of established practices in the market for 
second-hand goods unlawful. In preferring the defendant’s reading of the 
phrase, the Court was influenced in large measure by the “consequences” of 
the plaintiff ’s expansive reading, which it saw as likely to produce a parade 
                                                
123 Id. at 145-46. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 145. 
126 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
127 Id. at 1356-57. 
128 Id. at 1357-58. 
129 Id. at 1358. 
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of “horribles” when translated into practice.130 Despite offering a linguistic 
rationale for its holding,131 the Court drew on the common law basis of the 
first sale doctrine and its importance in commerce—which it argued was 
presumptively important even under the terms of the 1976 Act—to 
eventually conclude that the plaintiff ’s interpretation was neither required 
by the statute, nor indeed preferable given the underlying scheme and 
purposes of the doctrine as codified.132 
Kirtsaeng, unlike the Court’s other decisions in the area, can thus be seen 
as an effort to apply the equity of the statute to annul a partially ambiguous 
provision, all in the interests of rendering the copyright system compatible 
with a variety of common sense–driven commercial goals underlying the 
first sale doctrine. The “lawfully made” requirement was, as a result, 
rendered largely redundant after the decision. 
5. Public Performance: Aereo 
Another right that the 1976 Act grants authors is the exclusive right “to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly.”133 In an effort to cover cable 
television, which was fresh in Congress’s mind at the time of drafting, the 
Act further defines a “public performance” as either a performance in a 
public place or a transmission by a device or process regardless of whether 
members of the public “receive it in the same place or in separate places and 
at the same time or at different times.”134 
Aereo involved a service that picked up free over-the-air broadcast 
signals using antennae and then retransmitted the underlying content over 
the Internet for a fee to its subscribers. In order to differentiate itself from 
regular CATV services—which Congress had chosen to regulate under the 
terms of the Copyright Act—Aereo used thousands of dime-sized antennas, 
each of which was assigned to an individual subscriber when the subscriber 
chose to receive a stream of a near-live show.135 Additionally, to avoid 
seeming as though it were merely retransmitting the content, Aereo’s 
technology made a local copy of the content on its servers and streamed that 
local copy seconds after the recording began.136 The key question was 
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whether Aereo’s service violated the plaintiffs’ public performance right in 
their works.137 
The Court found that it did.138 Its logic was that Aereo’s service was far 
too similar to cable television, despite its differing technology.139 While the 
Court began with the statute’s definition of a public performance, its 
opinion soon placed all of its emphasis on Congress’s presumptive purpose 
in creating the public performance right—the regulation of cable television 
and analogous technologies.140 Looking to the state of the industry at the 
time of the 1976 Act, the Court characterized the Act’s public performance 
right as motivated by “Congress’ regulatory objectives”141 contained in its 
singular desire to “bring the activities of cable systems within the scope” of 
the statute.142 In light of this, to the Court, “Congress would as much have 
intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of 
Aereo as from those of cable companies.”143 
In Aereo, therefore, the Court directly discerned the equity of the 
copyright statute in order to expand its reach to a new technology.144 While 
couched in terms of a presumptive legislative intent, the Court’s reasoning 
comes down to its reconstruction of the Act’s “regulatory” logic,145 the idea 
that the statute’s balance—as embodied in the public performance right—
extends to all technologies of retransmission that follow the same structure 
of cable television by building a commercial model of delivery around freely 
available television broadcasts. In no uncertain terms, the Court’s opinion 
expanded the substantive content of the Act into new and potentially 
unforeseeable areas, a reality that the dissent in the case all too readily 
criticized.146 
B. Copyright’s Adjectival Equity 
When it comes to the remedial and procedural dimensions of the Act, 
the Court’s approach is analytically different from its approach to the 
substantive dimension. In dealing with the Act’s adjectival dimensions, the 
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Court is less concerned with determining the actual content of the law by 
reference to its own conception of copyright’s goals. Instead, its focus is on 
ensuring that the law remains sufficiently flexible, so as to allow future 
courts to apply it situationally in ways that further the copyright system’s 
goals and purposes. 
The Court’s approach to the Act’s adjectival component can be 
understood as driven by the need to preserve a central role for judicial 
discretion. The Court tailors the system’s procedures and remedies on an 
individual basis, so as to align them contextually with copyright’s goals. 
Copyright’s goals and purposes therefore remain motivational but enter the 
equation only as a justification for flexibility, rather than as a substantive 
influence to resolve doctrinal indeterminacy. In its jurisprudence, the Court 
consciously rejects readings of the Copyright Act that serve to limit the 
judicial function in policing and molding the remedies or processes that are 
applied to copyright cases. Seen as driven by an effort to preserve judicial 
discretion, the Court’s adjectival jurisprudence in copyright law represents 
an effort to use the equity of the statute to create a zone of equitable 
discretion within the functioning of the copyright system. 
1. Attorneys’ Fees: Fogerty 
Among the several remedies available to parties under the Copyright 
Act is a provision that allows courts in civil actions to “award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party . . . .”147 The question that soon 
emerged in a series of lower courts cases was whether this provision allowed 
a prevailing defendant to seek attorneys’ fees as well, or whether it was 
restricted in its scope to prevailing plaintiffs. 
The plaintiff in Fogerty argued that the Act incorporated a “dual 
approach” in § 505, which restricted attorneys’ fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs.148 Among the reasons offered by the plaintiff was the argument 
that “equitable considerations” embodied in the goals of the Act required 
adherence to the dual approach.149 The Court adamantly rejected this 
argument and held that the provision applies to prevailing defendants as 
well.150 It concluded that the dual approach adopts a “one-sided view of the 
purposes” underlying the Act.151 Tracing copyright’s goals back to the 
Constitution, the Court emphasized the “limited” nature of the copyright 
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monopoly,152 which in its view required encouraging defendants to litigate 
claims when they believe they might have “meritorious copyright 
defenses.”153 Such a “successful defense,” the Court argued, “may further the 
policies of the Copyright Act” as well.154  
While the Court rejected the dual approach, it also simultaneously 
refused to formulate a rule that would mandate an award of attorneys’ fees 
to any prevailing party.155 Instead, the Court chose to emphasize the 
importance of discretion: both parties were entitled to invoke the provision, 
but ultimately the decision whether to award attorneys’ fees was left to the 
“court’s discretion” as exercised in light of the individual circumstances of 
each case.156  
In adopting this intermediate approach, the Court’s principal concern 
appears to have been enabling future courts to tailor their awards to the 
unique circumstances of each case, regardless of whether it involves a 
successful plaintiff or a successful defendant. “Equitable discretion” was 
thus the touchstone of the provision for the Court, which it saw as essential 
for the realization of copyright’s goals and purposes. The system’s objectives 
were therefore a justification for the Court’s entrenchment of an equitable 
space in this area for future courts.  
2. Registration: Reed Elsevier 
Since 1988, the registration of a work is no longer a prerequisite for 
protection under the Act. However, § 411(a) of the Act requires a work to be 
registered with the Copyright Office before a “civil action for infringement” 
can be commenced in a federal court.157 In a vast majority of cases, this 
involves a plaintiff registering the work immediately prior to the 
commencement of an infringement action, and the provision serves no 
immediate purpose. The question that recently emerged, however, was 
whether this requirement barred a federal court from entertaining a lawsuit 
that involved both registered and unregistered works. 
In Reed Elsevier, the Court had to decide whether the registration 
requirement could be understood as a jurisdictional restriction, which would 
deny a federal court subject matter jurisdiction, or as a mere “claim-
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processing rule[],” which would not.158 A jurisdictional requirement operates 
as a limit on a court’s power to adjudicate a case by depriving the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction, thereby effectively limiting the statute’s reach 
and scope in certain domains.159 A claim-processing rule, on the other hand, 
gives a party raising the rule as a defense the possibility of procedural 
relief.160 All the same, when that party fails to raise the rule, it does not 
limit the ability of the court to reach the merits of the issue. In this 
conception, failure to register a work might be raised by a defendant for a 
dismissal of the case, but when not raised it places no bar on a court that 
chooses to hear the case. Treating § 411(a) as a jurisdictional rule would have 
significantly curtailed the ability of federal courts to reach the merits of a 
case when the defendant forfeits the defense. Examining the structure and 
purpose of the requirement the Court rather unequivocally concluded that 
the provision was a mere claim-processing requirement, with no 
jurisdictional effect.161 Courts were thus within their powers to hear 
infringement claims even when the work was unregistered. 
The defendant in the case also sought to argue that treating the 
registration requirement as a jurisdictional element would serve the 
underlying goals of the Act by encouraging registration of works.162 
Somewhat interestingly, the Court summarily dismissed this argument 
without examining whether there was any merit to this contention.163 To the 
Court, preserving courts’ jurisdiction to hear these cases appears to have 
been paramount, in order to preserve the integrity of the Act’s 
“comprehensive statutory scheme” and to avoid having the “remedial 
scheme” of the Act interfere with its substantive rights.164 Disempowering 
courts of their ability to hear copyright cases, merely because of 
noncompliance with the statute’s formalities, was unquestionably problematic 
to the Court. 
3. Laches: Petrella 
The Court’s most recent adjectival foray into the Copyright Act 
involved the equitable doctrine of laches. Laches, as understood in equity, 
involves a delay on the part of the plaintiff in commencing a lawsuit that 
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prejudices or disadvantages the defendant and allows the court to deny the 
claim altogether.165 It is traditionally invoked in situations where a statute 
contains no limitations period. The Copyright Act, however, does contain 
an express statute of limitations, requiring all civil actions to commence 
“within three years after the claim accrue[s].”166 The question that arose was 
thus whether the doctrine of laches could be invoked to bar claims even 
within this period of limitations. 
Again, the Court approached the question in terms of attempts to limit 
courts’ discretionary powers. The Ninth Circuit had treated the doctrine of 
laches as a bright-line rule and concluded that the doctrine could be 
“presume[d]” to bar the claim in its entirety if any part of the wrongful 
conduct occurred outside the three year window.167 In effect, the position of 
the Ninth Circuit, which the defendants supported before the Court, was 
that as long as some part of the defendants’ conduct occurred before the 
three year window, laches could be presumed without any showing of 
prejudice. This effectively barred the claim altogether, even if the plaintiff 
was only seeking a forward-looking remedy, such as an injunction, or one 
restricted to the previous three years. The Court saw this as an attempt to 
limit its discretion in individual cases, and rejected altogether the 
applicability of the laches doctrine to “bar” the suit within the statute of 
limitations.168 All the same, the Court recognized the need for such 
equitable flexibility, but concluded that it existed at the remedial level, in 
tailoring the kind of relief sought by the plaintiff, or through the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel.169 
A primary justification for its conclusion was the idea that copyright 
owners should not feel compelled to bring economically unjustifiable 
lawsuits against infringers, merely in order to preserve their rights—
something that the laches rule (as an absolute bar) would accomplish.170 The 
“presumptive bar” approach to laches in effect amounted to an approach 
that curbed, rather than extended, courts’ equitable discretion, and their 
ability to police when, why, or how copyright plaintiffs might choose to 
commence actions for infringement. The Court saw this limiting effect as 
antithetical to the realization of copyright’s goals on an individual basis, 
causing it to take the laches defense off the table altogether. Once again 
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preserving courts’ flexibility and discretion for the future seems to have 
been the Court’s principal motivation, which it saw as crucial to the 
realization of copyright’s goals. 
CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND REALISM                                
IN COPYRIGHT LAW  
 A review of the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence reveals much 
about copyright lawmaking in the United States, the role of courts therein, 
and the influences on their thinking. To begin with, it confirms the idea that 
in deciding copyright cases, the Court is quite self-consciously engaged in 
the process of making copyright law, not just applying it. In the four 
decades since the enactment of the Copyright Act, the Court’s own 
jurisprudence reveals a gradual and open acceptance of its lawmaking role, 
as other participants in the system have come to grow comfortable with the 
idea that courts do indeed make law in this area. In its most recent cases, 
however, the Court’s opinions leave no doubt that it has embraced this 
reality, an enduring influence of early Legal Realism.  
Our Article shows that given the statutory origins of copyright law, the 
Court’s approach to copyright lawmaking involves discerning the unstated 
equity underlying the statute, and giving effect to it through its doctrinal 
(re)formulations. The Court’s modus operandi in this regard begins with an 
identification of the indeterminacy of a statutory copyright directive, the 
formal doctrine so to speak. In theory, its lawmaking is confined to the 
interstices of the statute; rarely ever is the Court willing to overtly annul 
the terms of the statute. Its approach is thus to explicate the goals and 
purposes of the Copyright Act and creatively reshape doctrine in light of 
these purposes. The reshaping is always done by reference to a finite set of 
ideals, drawn to a large extent from the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate 
for the institution. Whenever possible, the Court’s lawmaking exercise 
attempts to develop a level of coherence and rationality within the working 
of the copyright system, drawn from these widely accepted purposes. In this 
sense, the Court’s jurisprudence exhibits a strong urge for systemic 
“rationality,” a trend seen among the later Legal Realists.171 As scholars have 
pointed out, this rationalist impulse was in tension with the core idea of 
indeterminacy that motivated the early Realists, and yet it came to be seen 
as critical to the constructive (as opposed to critical) project of Legal 
                                                
171 For an excellent overview of this development, see Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The 
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 611 (1993). 
  
1888 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1859 
 
Realism.172 This rationalist tendency in the Court’s copyright jurisprudence 
is very much a Realist phenomenon and evinces a distinctively pragmatic 
bent. The Court’s identification of doctrinal indeterminacy in the statute is 
therefore strongly complemented by its rationalist tendency, which of 
course takes different shapes depending on the particular question involved. 
All the same, however, merely because the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
area builds on the indeterminacy of extant copyright doctrine to justify its 
own lawmaking, one should not conclude that copyright doctrine—as 
contained in the statute—imposes no constraint whatsoever on the Court. 
Quite the contrary. The directives of the statute continue to influence the 
ways in which courts approach their lawmaking in the copyright context, 
which is why they implicitly resort to the process of determining the “equity 
of the statute.” 
In implicitly resorting to the “equity” of the copyright statute, rather 
than resorting to open-ended considerations of utility or social welfare, to 
resolve indeterminate doctrinal puzzles, the Court’s copyright jurisprudence 
might also be seen as consciously mediating extra-legal normative 
considerations through doctrinal ideas. The copyright statute’s equity is thus 
rendered a core part of copyright doctrine, constraining legal reasoning in 
the area.  
In summary then, the Court’s copyright jurisprudence since the passage 
of the Copyright Act of 1976 represents an extensive modern day 
application of the equity of the statute doctrine, as an unstated mechanism 
of lawmaking. In it, we see many of the lessons of Legal Realism 
internalized, in the process creating a robust equilibrium between the 
formal content of the statute and judge-made law. Rather than hide behind 
the indeterminacy of doctrine—be it statutory or otherwise—the Court 
appears to have actively embraced its role as a lawmaker in this area. 
Copyright law is regarded as “having purposes, not values in itself; and that 
the clearer visualization of the problems involved moves toward ever-
decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing emphasis on observable 
behavior.”173 Llewellyn would have been satisfied. 
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